George E. Brown, Jr. v. Carl Wanlass, Debbie Hansen, Gary Caldwell, Cindy Walker, Shauna Thomas, Ken Smith, Terry V. Fox, Marta Murvosh, Michael Patrick, The Daily Herald, the Pulitzer Community Newspapers, Inc., and John Does 1 Through 75 : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
George E. Brown, Jr. v. Carl Wanlass, Debbie
Hansen, Gary Caldwell, Cindy Walker, Shauna
Thomas, Ken Smith, Terry V. Fox, Marta Murvosh,
Michael Patrick, The Daily Herald, the Pulitzer
Community Newspapers, Inc., and John Does 1
Through 75 : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George E. Brown, Jr.; Attorney Pro Se for Appellant.
Andrew M. Morse; Heather S. White; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Brown, Jr. v. Wanlass, No. 990932 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2398
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
No. 990932-CA 
CARL WANLASS, DEBBIE HANSEN, 
GARY CALDWELL, CINDY 
WALKER, SHAUNA THOMAS, KEN 
SMITH, TERRY V. FOX, MARTA 
MURVOSH, MICHAEL PATRICK, 
THE DAILY HERALD, a corporation, 
and THE PULITZER COMMUNITY 
NEWSPAPERS, INC., a corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 75, 
Argument Priority 15 
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court 
Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable Gary D. Stott, Presiding 
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR. 
Attorney Pro Se for Appellant 
# 6 West Main Street, Suite B 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
ANDREW M. MORSE (A4498) 
HEATHER S. WHITE (A7674) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Appellees 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5pi | C Q 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 ' ' \ ^ 
Utah Court of Awwwe 
JUL 0 5 2000 
Julia D*Alaeandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
No. 990932-CA 
vs. 
CARL WANLASS, DEBBIE HANSEN, Argument Priority 15 
GARY CALDWELL, CINDY 
WALKER, SHAUNA THOMAS, KEN 
SMITH, TERRY V. FOX, MARTA (ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
MURVOSH, MICHAEL PATRICK, 
THE DAILY HERALD, a corporation, 
and THE PULITZER COMMUNITY 
NEWSPAPERS, INC., a corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 75, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court 
Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable Gary D. Stott, Presiding 
ANDREW M. MORSE (A4498) 
HEATHER S. WHITE (A7674) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Appellees 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR. Post Office Box 45000 
Attorney Pro Se for Appellant Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
# 6 West Main Street, Suite B Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
LIST OF PARTIES 
All parties are identified in the caption. However, Marta Murvosh, Michael Patrick, 
The Daily Herald, and The Pulitzer Community Newspapers, Inc. are not parties to this 
appeal. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
GOVERNING LAW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
INTRODUCTION 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. THE PETITION CLAUSE BARS THIS CLAIM 10 
II. THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ESTABLISH THE CITY 
EMPLOYEES ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THEIR OFFICIAL 
CAPACITIES 16 
A. Section 63-30-10C2) of the Act Provides Absolute Immunity 
Against Brown's Claims 16 
B. Section 63-30-10(5) of the Act Provides Absolute Immunity 
Against Brown's Claims 18 
III. THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ESTABLISH THE CITY 
EMPLOYEES ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THEIR PERSONAL 
CAPACITIES 19 
A. His Fraud Claim Fails 19 
B He Has Not Shown Malice 21 
CONCLUSION 23 
ADDENDUM 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cage? 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) 11 
Associated BodyWorks and Massage Professionals v. AMTA, 897 F.Supp. 
1116 (N.D. 111. 1995) 15 
Barnes Found, v. Township of Lower Merion, 927 F. Supp. 874 (E.D.Pa. 1996) . . . . 13 
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1996) 18 
Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155 
(3d Cir. 1988) 13, 16 
Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass 'n., 182 F.3d 1132 
(10th Cir. 1999) 15 
Cheminar Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corporation, 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1999) 15 
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991) 14 
Cogeneration, Inc., v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996) . . . 14 
Concourse Nursing Home v. Engelstein, 692 N.Y.S.2d'888 (S.Ct.N.Y. 1999) . . . . 14 
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) 20 
Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F. Supp.2d 1315 (D. Utah 1998) 17 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
365 U.S. 127 (1961) 11-14 
Eaton v. Newport Bd. ofEduc, 975 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1992) 14 
Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) 13 
King v. Township of East Lampeter, 17 F.Supp.2d 394 (E.D.Pa. 1998) 15 
ii 
Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Centers, 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) 15 
Lobiondo v. Schwartz, 733 A.2d 518 (N.J. 1999) 13 
Molina v. Spanos, 1999 WL 626126 (10th Cir. 1999) 17 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) 13 
Obernoffv. City and County of Denver, 900 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir. 1990) 15 
Protect Our Mountain Env % Inc. v. District Court, 617 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) . . . 13 
Ryanv. Dan's Foods, 972 P.2d395 (Utah 1998) 1 
Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 1982) 13 
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) 12 
Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Association, 467 F.Supp. 803 (S.D.N. Y. 1979) 15 
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994) 16 
WestfieldPartners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523 (N.D.I11. 1990) 13 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-607 (1953, as amended) 18 
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-826 (1953, as amended) 18 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1, etseq. (1953, as amended) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-4(3) and (4) (1953, as amended) 1, 3, 9, 10, 20, 21, 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953, as amended) 1, 3, 9, 16, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5) (1953, as amended) 1, 3, 9, 16, 18, 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (1953, as amended) 1 
Rules and Regulations 
Rule 9(b), Utah R. Civ. P 1, 19 
Other 
Barker, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev 11 
Pring, 7 Pace Envtl. L. Rev 10, 11 
U.S. Const, amend. 1 1, 9 
Utah Const. Art. I § 1 1 
iv 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant George E. Brown, Jr., appeals the summary judgment dismissing Appellees, 
seven employees of American Fork City. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
A. Issue 
In granting summary judgment, did the trial court correctly conclude the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act §§ 63-30-1, et seq., bars Brown's defamation and emotional 
distress claims against the employees? 
B. Standard of Review 
Summaiy judgment presents only a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Ryan 
v. Dan's Foods, 972 P.2d 395, 400 (Utah 1998). 
GOVERNING LAW 
The Petition Clause of the First Amendment bars plaintiffs claim. U.S. Const, 
amend. 1; See also Utah Const. Art. I § 1. Various statutory bars to his claims are embodied 
in the Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30-10(2), 63-30-10(5) and 63-30-4(3) and (4) 
(1953, as amended.) Rule 9(b), Utah R. Civ. P. is also relevant and is set forth in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
INTRODUCTION. 
This is a political dispute that has no business in court. It is brought by lawyer 
Brown, a former city councilman, against seven city employees for petitioning the city 
council to address Brown's erratic behavior. It was dismissed because the First Amendment 
to the Constitution guarantees the employees every right to petition their government for 
redress of grievances. This Constitutional right is the foundation for the provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act that provide three independent statutory bars to Brown's action. 
The dismissal should be affirmed. 
A. Nature of the Case, Coarse of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Mr. Brown was an erratic councilman for American Fork City. After several public 
incidents, forty-five city employees petitioned the City Council to do something about 
Mr. Brown. The Council considered the grievance, but did not take any formal action. 
Mr. Brown retaliated and sued seven of the forty-five, alleging defamation and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. He also sued newspapers and their reporters for reporting, 
inter alia, about the grievance. All defendants moved for summary judgment. The 
newspaper defendants were dismissed because the reported information was true, was not 
defamatory, and was protected by the public interest and fair reporting privileges. Plaintiff 
did not appeal that dismissal. 
The city employees were also dismissed, the court holding three separate provisions 
on the Governmental Immunity Act barred plaintiffs claims: 
2 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953, as amended) prohibits claims arising out 
of "abuse of power, libel, slander" and "infliction of mental anguish." This bars both the 
defamation and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. 
2. The grievance was the initiation of an administrative proceeding against 
Mr. Brown, so defendants are immune under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5), which bars 
claims arising out of "the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause." Utah CodeAnn. § 63-30-10(5) 
(1953, as amended.) 
3. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) (1953, as amended), the action against 
the employees are barred because there is no evidence that the employees "acted or failed 
to act through fraud or malice." The grievance, on its face, does not constitute legal malice 
under Utah law. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Brown fails to meet his burden of showing that the trial court ignored issues of 
* 
material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. He fails to recite those facts 
with specificity or explain how they are material. This Court should accept the trial court's 
ruling that the material facts were undisputed, and review only the accuracy of the trial 
court's application of the law to the facts. 
1. Brown's Facts Are Not Evidence. 
The great majority of Brown's twelve pages of facts are irrelevant. They have nothing 
to do with whether the Petition Clause of the First Amendment and the Governmental 
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Immunity Act bars his claims. Moreover, most of Brown's asserted facts are either hearsay 
or conclusory allegations. They are not evidence. He gives a narrative history of his tenure 
as a City Council member, including how people were out to get him, and how he thinks they 
tried to remove him from office. He attempts to justify yelling at a former City employee. 
He tries prove that because a City phone bill shows a telephone call to a number he asserts 
belonged to the Salt Lake Tribune, that someone faxed something, impliedly the grievance, 
to the Salt Lake Tribune. 
He explains how newspaper reporters called him to question him about police reports 
involving alleged incidents of misconduct by Brown, how he was wrongly accused, and his 
unsuccessful attempts to obtain the pohce investigation files through GRAMA requests. He 
details alleged violations of GRAMA laws, which he did not assert in his Complaint and 
which are the subject of other litigation. He alleges the City's police chief improperly 
disclosed to the newspaper defendants police reports involving him. Yet, he did not name 
the chief as a defendant. He even recites verbatim a letter to the editor published in the 
American Fork Citizen newspaper as evidence of his good actions at City Hall. None of 
these so-called facts relate in any way to the allegedly defamatory statements in the 
grievance. 
Much of Brown's "citations to the record" are not cites to admissible evidence. For 
example, the first three pages of his Statement of Facts, Brown repeatedly cites as evidence 
the introduction section of his memorandum in opposition to the Newspaper Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. [Brown brief, pp. 4-6.] He cites to multiple affidavits he 
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filed, the majority of them his own, comprised of inadmissible hearsay, opinions and legal 
conclusions. (See employees Motion to Strike, R. 973-984.) He relies on newspaper 
articles as evidence. He cites an opinion letter and a GRAMA decision that are wholly 
irrelevant. He even cites allegations in his Complaint as evidence. Brown's Statement of 
Facts is unreliable and not based on the record. 
2. Undisputed Facts Supporting Summary Judgment. 
Brown was a member of the American Fork City Council at all relevant times. 
(R. 36.) During his term as a City Council member, he verbally and physically abused 
numerous employees of the City. (R. 864, 868, 872.) He yelled at one employee about an 
item she placed on the agenda for a City Council meeting. The employee broke down into 
tears. (R. 864 868, 872.) He repeatedly threatened other city employees in a violent manner 
causing them to fear for their safety and the safety of others. (R. 864.) Brown often sneered 
at female employees. (R. 860.) He even tried to humiliate an American Fork City citizen 
at a City Council meeting by dismissing a question asked by the citizen, because the citizen's 
wife was one of several employees who filed a class action lawsuit against Brown. (R. 857.) 
On June 24, 1997, a city employee voiced his opinion about City matters during a 
City Council meeting. (R. 853-54.) The following day, Brown confronted him and 
instructed him never to stand up in City Council and make derogatory comments again. 
(R 853-54.) The City Administrator, who witnessed Brown's verbal attack on the employee, 
told Brown to stop threatening City workers. (R. 851.) 
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Thereafter, American Fork City police received a report that Brown was out of control 
at City Hall. An officer and a lieutenant responded and saw the city employee that Brown 
had attacked leaving the building. They asked what happened. (R. 843-49.) While they 
wrere talking, Brown came out and tried to tell the employee what to WTite in his statement 
to the police. The employee told Brown to leave him alone. To prevent a potential 
altercation, the lieutenant stepped between Brown and the employee. Brown grabbed the 
lieutenant by the arm to push him out of the way. The lieutenant told Brown not to touch 
him or he would arrest Brown. The police cited Brown for assaulting a police officer. 
(R. 843-49.) Brown was prosecuted and entered a plea in abeyance. (R. 0562.) 
Tired of Brown's abusive and threatening behavior, 45 employees filed a formal 
written grievance with the City Administrator against Brown. (R. 839-41.) (Addendum, E.) 
The City Administrator was responsible for handling all personnel matters relating to 
American Fork City employees. (R. 864.) In the grievance, the employees alleged seven 
types of wrongful conduct by Brown: 
1. Brown threatened and intimidated a City employee for voicing his opinion 
during a City Council meeting; 
2. Brown attempted to incite a confrontation with employees at City Hall 
following a City Council meeting; 
3. Brown assaulted a police officer during the officer's investigation of a 
disorderly conduct claim against Brown; 
4. Brown attempted to coerce a City employee into giving a false statement to a 
officer; 
5. Brown repeatedly threatened to fire employees for disagreeing with him; 
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6. Brown repeatedly violated City policies and procedures by degrading, 
embarrassing and demeaning them in public; and 
7. Brown repeatedly discriminated against, ridiculed, demeaned and coerced 
female employees. 
(R. 839-41.) None of the defendant employees drafted the grievance. They only signed it. 
(R. 872, 868, 860, 857, 836, 833.) Mr. Brown did not sue the author of the grievance. 
The employees were at all relevant times employees of American Fork City. (R. 36-
37.) Each statement in the grievance concerned matters relating exclusively to their 
employment with the City, such as how they were treated on the job by City officials. 
(R. 839-841.) None of the statements addressed any personal issues the employees may have 
had with Brown. (R. 839-841.) Each statement in the grievance raised concerns of the 
employees solely in their capacities as employees of American Fork City. (R. 1031.) By 
filing the grievance, employees intended to bring Brown's offensive and abusive conduct to 
the attention of City officials, and to initiate administrative proceedings against Brown, 
thereby putting an end to his bad behavior. (R. 872, 868, 860, 857, 836, 833.) None of the 
employees gave a copy of the grievance to any person or entity, other than the City 
Administrator, nor did they reveal the contents of the grievance to anyone else. (R. 872, 868, 
860, 857, 836, 833.) 
The American Fork City Council, not the City Administrator, is responsible for 
reviewing complaints about City Council members. Consequently, upon receipt of the 
grievance, defendant City Administrator Wanlass forwarded it to the American Fork City 
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Council for review. (R. 864.) He never gave a copy of the grievance to anyone other than 
the members of the American Fork City Council. (R. 864.) 
The Council asked the City Attorney whether under formal written city policies and 
procedures the Council had to proceed against Brown. (R. 926.) The City Attorney opined 
that the policy and procedure manual did not apply to Councilpersons. (R. 924.) The 
Council proceeded no further. 
Brown alleged that the Newspaper Defendants defamed him by reporting he 
"assaulted" a police officer, and was charged with misdemeanor when he was ultimately 
charged with disorderly conduct, an infraction. (R. 29.) The Newspaper defendants got out 
on summary judgment because the allegedly defamatory statements were not actionable 
because, inter alia, they were true, they did not convey a defamatory meaning and the 
damaging impact of any defamatory statement was nominal compared with the damage done 
by the truthful statement. (R. 185-86.) Stating that Brown was charged with a misdemeanor 
instead of an infraction was not defamatory, because it was "true or substantially true as a 
matter of law and, therefore, Brown's claim fails." (R. 1012.) "[T]he Article's inaccurate 
reference to the disorderly conduct charge against Brown as a 'misdemeanor' rather than an 
'infraction' does not, as a matter of law, render the statement false." (R. 1012.) The trial 
court continued, "Such an error in legal terminology cannot serve as the basis for Brown's 
defamation claim, particularly where the term 'misdemeanor' is commonly understood to 
describe relatively minor, non-felony offenses, an infraction is such an offense, and the 
8 
Article accurately reported the underlying allegation upon which the charge against Brown 
was based." (R. 1012.) Brown did not appeal the trial court's ruling. 
The employees also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the Petition Clause 
of the First Amendment and §§ 63-30-10(2) & 63-30-10(5) of the Governmental Immunity 
Act bar Brown's claims. (R. 832-92 and 1046, p.4. [Summary Judgment hearing 
transcript.]) The employees also argued § 63-30-4(4) of the Act barred his claims against 
the employees personally because Brown failed to produce any evidence whatsoever that 
they acted with malice. (R. 832-92.) The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment 
in favor of the employees. (R. 1029-1032.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The First Amendment's Petition Clause guarantees the right "to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const., amend. 1. It is a near absolute right. 
Even without the statutory immunities relied on by the court, this formidable constitutional 
right bars plaintiffs claims. 
The trial court correctly ruled the Governmental Immunity Act bars Brown's claims 
against the employees in their official capacities. Specifically, Utah Code.Ann. § 63-30-
10(2) preserves immunity for injuries resulting from "abuse of process, libel, [and] slander" 
by a governmental employee. Further, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5) retains immunity for 
injuries resulting from the "institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause." The undisputed facts establish the 
employees signed the grievance in their capacities as employees, and that all of the 
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allegations in the grievance concerned matters relating exclusively to Brown's treatment of 
them as City employees. Therefore, signing the grievance was done within the course and 
scope of their employment. They are immune from suit in their official capacities. 
The trial court also correctly ruled the Act bars Brown's claims against the employees 
in their personal capacities. A governmental employee is not personally liable for acts 
occurring within her scope of employment, unless she acts with fraud or malice. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-4(3). The undisputed facts demonstrate the allegations in the grievance were 
based upon specific instances of misconduct by Brown and were, therefore, not fraudulent. 
Moreover, Brown did not plead specific facts alleging the employees knowingly or recklessly 
made a false representations of existing fact about him, nor did he present any evidence to 
rebut their testimony that they signed the grievance not to retaliate against Brown, but to end 
to his tyrannical, odd behavior. Brown presented no evidence that the employees acted with 
fraud or malice, so they are immune from Brown's personal capacity claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETITION CLAUSE BARS THIS CLAIM. 
The First Amendment Petition Clause guarantees the right "to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances," and "protects] any peaceful, lawful attempt to 
promote or discourage government action at all levels and branches of government." Pring, 
7 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. at 9 (citations omitted). Protected activity includes political advocacy, 
lobbying and testifying to the government, writing letters about public matters, public debate, 
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and making complaints or reporting violations to governmental bodies. Barker, 26 Loy. L. A. 
L. Rev. at 425. 
The Petition Clause is part of the panoply of rights which "encourage, promote, and 
make it a test of good citizenship for Americans to debate, campaign, lobby, testify, 
complain, litigate, demonstrate, and otherwise 'invoke the law' on public issues." Pring, 7 
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. at 11 (citation omitted). As one commentator observed: 
the petition clause, indeed our entire political system, recognizes 
that the "word of the represented" is essential to the way 
government shapes our lives [T]he right is not dependent on 
whether the citizens' views are right or wrong, wise or foolish, 
public-spirited or venally self interested. Implicit in this 
concept is a very modern . . . view of the superior 
competitiveness of truth in a free market of ideas. As Justice 
Holmes stated in one of his famous dissents, destined to become 
the law: "[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached in free 
trade in ideas [and] the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. 
. . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." 
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). Another commentator observed that the right to petition is so well-protected 
that "courts have universally declared that [even] common-law malice, or ill-will, will not 
defeat the petitioning privilege," and that "courts will not interfere with the exercise of the 
right... absent sham or fraud, or in some cases, even with sham or fraud." Barker, 26 Loy. 
L.A. L. Rev. at 427 (citations omitted). 
Numerous cases illustrate the broad sweep of the Petition Clause to protect citizens' 
rights to petition the government to act or not to act. For example, in Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), trucking 
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companies ("truckers") sued railroads, claiming the railroads conspired to conduct a publicity 
campaign designed to foster distaste for truckers and the adoption of laws destructive of the 
trucking business. Id. at 129. Their activities included lobbymg the governor of 
Pennsylvania to veto the "Fair Truck Bill," which would have allowed truckers to carry 
heavier loads on Pennsylvania roads. Id. at 130. The trial court and the circuit court held 
that the railroads violated antitrust laws with their actions. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, relying primarily on the railroads' first 
amendment right to petition. Id. at 143-45. The Court observed that attempts to influence 
legislation always results in the party against whom the campaign is made facing potential 
injury. Id. It pointed out that: 
In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of 
government act on behalf of the people and, to a veiy large 
extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the 
ability of the people to make their wishes known to their 
representatives. To hold that the government retains the power 
to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same 
time, that people cannot freely inform the government of their 
wishes would . . . be particularly unjustified. 
Id. at 137. The Court also observed that there is generally only one situation where 
petitioning with the purpose of influencing government action might not be protected, i.e., 
where the campaign "is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt 
to interfere directly with the business relationship of a competitor." Id. at 144 (emphasis 
added). 
Four years later, the Court reiterated its support of Petition Clause protections in 
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). One of the issues 
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there was a union's petitioning the Secretary of Labor, which a coal company claimed had 
resulted in its injury. Id. at 669-672. Relying on Noerr, the Court rejected the idea that the 
union could be liable for its actions in petitioning the government. Id. at 671. These cases 
comprise the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
Significantly, in Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized Noerr and that "[t]he First Amendment protects expressions designed to 
influence governmental action even when the content of those expressions brings incidental 
injury to parties concerned." Id. at 689. See also Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. 
Supp. 523 (N.D.I11. 1990) (developer's suit against protesting neighbors barred); Lobiondo 
v. Schwartz, 733 A.2d at 518-19 (N.J. 1999) (same). 
Other courts have likewise relied on the Petition Clause to protect citizens' rights to 
communicate on issues of public importance. See Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, 
Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1988) (defendants' actions in calling nursing 
home's violations to attention of state and federal authorities and rousing public interest 
protected by Petition Clause and cannot serve as basis for tort liability); Barnes Found, v. 
Township of Lower Merlon, 927 F. Supp. 874, 876-78 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (neighbors who met 
to discuss and later protest alleged violations of land use ordinances exempt from tort 
liability).1 
1
 See also, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (Noerr-
Pennington doctrine immunizes citizens from liability for exercising right to boycott); 
Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (Petition Clause provides 
absolute privilege and protects citizens from liability for zoning dispute); Protect Our 
Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984) (applying Noerr-
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Brown contends that the employees acted with malice and that therefore he states a 
claim for relief. These allegations, even if true, do not prove a sham within the meaning of 
the Noerr Pennington Doctrine. \n City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 
U.S. 365 (1991), the court held that it was "irrelevant that a petitioning party's political 
motives are selfish," because the Petition Clause "shields . . . a conceited effort to 
influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose." In Omni, die plaintiff had 
alleged that a competitor who had petitioned the government for favorable legislation 
spread "untrue and malicious rumors about Omni and attempted to induce Omni's 
customers to break their contracts." Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. at 380. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the competitor's activities were protected by the 
Petition Clause. Courts have steadfastly held that the petitioner's intent is irrelevant. 
Eastern RR Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Cogeneration, Inc., v. Florida 
Power & Light Co., 16 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996); Concourse Nursing Home v. Engelstein, 
692 N.Y.S.2d 888 (S.Ct.N.Y. 1999). 
Courts across the country reject each and every complaint that Mr. Brown makes 
about the employees petitioning activities. For example, false statements made in petitioning 
activities are immune under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. 
Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980); so is labeling the plaintiff a racist, Eaton v. 
Newport Bd. ofEduc, 975 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1992); spreading false derogatory rumors, 
Pennington doctrine to suit for abuse of process and civil conspiracy). 
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Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980); filing groundless 
complaints, Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Association, 467 F.Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 
acting out of "animus," Associated BodyWorks and Massage Professionals v. AMTA, 897 
F.Supp. 1116 (N.D. 111. 1995); accusing plaintiff of not following ordinances, King v. 
Township of East Lampeter, 17 F.Supp.2d 394 (E.D.Pa. 1998); and communicating ex parte 
with legislators, holding secret meetings with officials, and making covert agreements 
between petitioners and policy makers, Obernoffv. City and County of Denver, 900 F.2d 
1434 (10th Cir. 1990). 
The employees' United States constitutional immunity, via the Supremacy Clause, 
defeats any state law cause of action. Cheminar Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corporation, 168 F.3d 
119 (3d Cir. 1999) (tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective 
economic relation, unfair competition and malicious prosecution claims fall to Petition 
Clause immunity). Consequently, they have immunity, and every cause of action arising out 
of their petitioning activities fails. Associated BodyWorks & Massage Professionals v. 
AMTA, 897 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (N.D.I11. 1995) (libel claim fails); Gorman Towers, Inc. 
v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (libel claim fails); Kottle v. Northwest Kidney 
Centers, 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (libel claim fails); Cardtoons v. Major League 
Baseball Players Assyn., 182 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 1999) (libel claim trumped by 
Petition Clause immunity). 
The Petition Clause guarantees the rights of citizens to become involved in 
government matters, and our form of government depends on this involvement. It is an 
1S 
affront for Mr. Brown to subject the employees to this harassing litigation simply because 
they took advantage of their rights and obligations as citizens. As one court observed, "[t]he 
problem is not too much citizen involvement but too little." Brownsville, 839 F.2d at 160. 
The employees' summary judgment should accordingly be affirmed. 
II. THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ESTABLISH THE CITY 
EMPLOYEES ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THEIR OFFICIAL 
CAPACITIES. 
To state a defamation claim, plaintiff must prove the allegedly defamatory statements 
are not subject to any privilege. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007-08 (Utah 
1994). The employees asserted Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10(2) & (5) provides them with 
absolute immunity from Brown's claims. Brown not only failed to establish that the 
privileges in these statutes do not apply, but more fundamentally he failed to show any 
material issues of fact to preclude summary judgment. 
A. Section 63-30-1 Of2) of the Act Provides Absolute Immunity Against 
Brown's Claims. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953, as amended) expressly retains immunity for 
municipal employees and officials for claims "aris[ing] out of, in connection with, or 
resulting] from . . . abuse of process, libel, slander . . . [and] infliction of mental anguish . 
. . ." This statutory bar is unqualified, and is not defeated by evidence of malice. Brown 
admits in his complaint that each of the employees were employed by the City at all relevant 
times (R. 36.), and at summary judgment he submitted no evidence to the contrary. The trial 
court concluded the employees were acting within the course and scope of their employment 
when they signed the grievance and, therefore, § 63-30-10(2) bars his claims. Brown does 
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not challenge this conclusion on appeal On this basis alone, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's ruling. 
In any event, the court correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953, 
as amended), to bar defamation and emotional distress claims regardless of the underlying 
facts, even if they prove malice. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held without further 
explanation in Molina v. Spanos, 1999 WL 626126 (10th Cir. 1999), that §63-30-10(2) 
barred a plaintiffs against government agents defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims. Molina had asserted that County officials acted with the specific 
intent to damage him. 
Similarly, in Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F. Supp.2d 1315 (D. Utah 1998), the court held that 
§63-30-10(2) barred claims against Sandy City and its officials, both in their representative 
and personal capacities, for defamation arising out of the officials' reports of alleged child 
abuse to the Division of Child and Family Services. Likewise, in Devlin plaintiff asserted 
that defendants acted with malice. 
As in Molina and Devlin, it is undisputed that the employees were employed by the 
City at all relevant times, and the grievance related solely to the employees' terms and 
conditions of employment. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled §63-30-10(2) bars 
Brown's claims. 
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B. Section 63-30-10(5) of the Act Provides Absolute Immunity Against 
Brown's Claims. 
There is immunity for municipal employees and officials against claims "aris[ing] out 
o£ in connection with, or resulting] from . . . the institution or prosecution of any judicial 
or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause . . ., ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(5) (1953, as amended) (emphasis added). Nothing in the statute requires 
that an administrative hearing actually occur. Here the employees signed the grievance to 
alert City officials to Brown's offensive and abusive conduct, so the Council would initiate 
administrative proceedings against Brown to put an end to his bad behavior. Brown did not 
rebut any of that testimony. Based upon these undisputed facts, the trial court concluded 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5) (1953, as amended) barred Brown's claims. 
Brown argues the City's policies and procedures do not give the City Council the 
authority to initiate administrative proceedings against a City Council member. However, 
state law provides: "The governing body of each municipality may fine or expel any member 
for disorderly conduct on a two-thirds vote of the members of the governing body." Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-607. The term "governing body," while not expressly defined in the Act, 
has been repeatedly held by Utah courts to be the mayor and the city council. Bellonio v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1996). The council also has the power to remove 
a member from office if she is guilty of "oppression, malconduct, misfeasance or 
malfeasance in office." Utah Code Ann. §10-3-826 (1953, as amended). Beyond that, the 
Petition Clause expressly allows citizens "to petition the Government for a redress of 
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grievances." Thus, the City Council had the authority to initiate administrative proceedings 
against Brown. 
Brown also argues that the City Council never initiated any proceedings relating to 
the grievance against him. The fact the City Council, which Brown was a member of, chose 
not to initiate an administrative review against Brown, one of their own, is immaterial. The 
controlling factor is the employees' intent in signing the grievance, not the council's 
technical ability or political resolve to act. 
In the end, it is undisputed that the employees thought they were taking proper steps 
to improve their working conditions. They alerted City officials to Brown's maltreatment 
of them as employees. Although the City Council did not initiate a formal administrative 
review or conduct a hearing on the grievance allegations, it did investigate them by asking 
the city attorney whether they had to proceed with the grievance. The statements in the 
grievance were, therefore, made in connection with the institution of an administrative 
proceeding and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5) (1953, as amended) bars Brown's claims. 
Ill THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ESTABLISH THE CITY 
EMPLOYEES ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THEIR PERSONAL 
CAPACITIES. 
A. His Fraud Claim Fails. 
The trial court correctly held that Brown failed to plead fraud with sufficient 
particularity, dismissing the claim. Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that fraud claims be pled with particularity. Brown alleged in his Complaint that the 
employees fraudulently signed the grievance, but he never stated with particularly any fraud 
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elements. To plead fraud, plaintiff must specifically allege that the defendant knowingly or 
recklessly made a false representation of an existing material fact for the puipose of inducing 
reliance thereon, actual reliance reasonable under the circumstances, resulting in injury. 
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). Brown failed to do so. 
In DeBry, the plaintiffs filed a claim against a Salt Lake County building inspector 
alleging the inspector fraudulently issued a building permit for a defective building they 
purchased. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' fraud claim as a matter of law pursuant 
to § 63-30-4(4) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
reasoning the plaintiffs "did not allege with specificity that.. . [the inspector] intentionally 
or recklessly misrepresented an existing fact to the . . . [plaintiffs]." Id. at 443. The court 
continued, "Furthermore, they do not allege that a misrepresentation was made with the 
intent of inducing . . . [them] to rely on the representation to their detriment." Id. 
Brown asserted only that the allegedly defamatory statements were published with 
fraud. He failed, however, to allege specific facts to support his claim. Like the plaintiffs 
in DeBry, Brown failed to plead fraud with particularity. Consequently, the trial court 
correctly ruled Brown failed as a matter of law to adequately plead his claims for fraud. 
Even if Brown had pled fraud with sufficient particularity, the undisputed facts 
establish the allegations in the grievance were not fraudulent, and they were grounded in 
fact. The employees testified about numerous specific instances when Brown verbally and 
physically abused not only them but others as well. He yelled at and threatened them for 
doing their jobs, sneered at female employees, and even attempted to humiliate a citizen 
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because his wife was one of several employees who filed a class action lawsuit against him. 
Brown tried to tell a city employee what he could and could not say during City Council 
meetings, threatened him if he did not obey him in the future and told him what to write in 
his statement to the police. He also struck a police officer who was investigating the matter, 
and otherwise interfered with the officer's investigation. Although he was only charged only 
with disorderly conduct, he was also cited for assaulting a police officer. 
Brown argues the statement he "assaulted" a police officer is defamatory, because he 
was charged with disorderly conduct, not assault. He further argues that charge was 
ultimately dismissed. The trial court expressly ruled the Newspaper Defendants' "inaccurate 
reference to the disorderly conduct charge against Brown as a 'misdemeanor' rather than an 
'infraction' does not, as a matter of law, render the statement false" and that "[s]uch an error 
in legal terminology cannot serve as the basis for Brown's defamation claim, particularly 
where the term 'misdemeanor' is commonly understood to describe relatively minor, non-
felony offenses, an infraction is such an offense, and the Article accurately reported the 
underlying allegation upon which the charge against Brown was based." Brown did not 
challenge that ruling and is, therefore, bound by it on appeal. 
B. He Has Not Shown Malice. 
The trial court also concluded Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (1953, as amended) of 
the Act barred Brown's claims against the employees in their personal capacities. Section 
63-30-4(4) states, "[N]o employee may be held personally liable for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, 
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or under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act 
due to fraud or malice." Brown argues the trial court should not have dismissed his claims, 
because he presented facts tending to show the employees signed the grievance with malice. 
The facts show they intended to bring to the Council's attention Brown's offensive 
and abusive conduct and to initiate administrative proceedings against Brown, thereby 
putting an end to his inappropriate behavior. They gave the grievance to the City 
Administrator, who they believed was responsible for initiating proceedings against Brown. 
Brown argues the employees published the grievance to others, but presented no evidence 
to contradict their testimony that none of them ever gave a copy of the grievance to any 
individual or entity other than the City Administrator or revealed the contents of the 
grievance to anyone other than him. The statements in the grievance concerned matters 
relating exclusively to their employment with the City, such as how they were treated on the 
job by City officials, and did not address any personal issues outside of their employment 
that they may have had with Brown. The City Administrator testified the City Council is the 
entity responsible for reviewing complaints about City Council members, so he sent the 
grievance to them. He never gave a copy of the grievance to anyone other than the members 
of the American Fork City Council. Brown failed to present any evidence to the contrary. 
To put an end to Brown's abusive and threatening behavior, the employees did what 
any employee would do: they told their supervisor. They did so collectively and in writing 
to impress upon their "boss" the seriousness of their complaints. Under Brown's argument, 
these distinctions make no difference. He would have sued them for slander instead, which 
is simply another type of defamation. Taken to a logical conclusion, Brown could sue for 
defamation if any of the employees had reported to her boss that Brown sexually harassed 
her. This is not they type of communication the law meant to prohibit. 
There was simply no evidence, direct or inferred, that the employees signed the 
grievance with malice. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled § 63-30-4(4) bars 
Brown's claims as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm summary judgment and award 
fees and costs to appellees. 
DATED this 5 c t a y of July, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM 
The following addendum is submitted pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(a)(ll). 
A. United States Constitution, Amendment I 
B Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1 
C. Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-10(2) and (5). 
D Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-4(3) and (4). 
E. Rule 9, Ut. R. Civ. P. 
F. Grievance 
Tab A 
Amend. I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VIII 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal act ions — Provis ions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensat ion clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases .] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
[Bail — Punishment . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fi 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people . ] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, sh 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by • 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to s tates or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by t 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against s tates — Restriction of judicial power. 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be cc 
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Sta; 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of Pres ident and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vo 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state wi* 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person vott 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for i 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all pe 
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for . 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lis 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Pre> 
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in th 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open a 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—Th 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presiden 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of th 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person ha\ 
such majority, then from the persons having the highe.-
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for a 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immed 
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Presiden 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation froi 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose sha 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the state-
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upo: 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then th 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of th 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—Th 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of th 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, th 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for th 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number c 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall b 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligibl* 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice 
President of the United States. 
TabB 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. Declaration of Rights 
II. State Boundaries 
III. Ordinance 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage 
V. Distribution of Powers 
VI. Legislative Department 
VII. Executive Department 
VIII. Judicial Department 
DC. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment 
X. Education 
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns 
XI. Local Governments [Proposed] 
XII. Corporations 
XIII. Revenue and Taxation 
XIV. Public Debt 
XV. Militia 
XVI. Labor 
XVII. Water Rights 
XVIII. Forestry 
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions 
XX. Public Lands 
XXI. Salaries 
XXII. Miscellaneous 
XXIII. Amendment and Revision 
XXIV. Schedule 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
tf Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
TION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
- [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
[Religious liberty] [Proposed.] 
5- [Habeas corpus.] 
$ [Right to bear arms.] 
' [Due process of law.] 
*• [Offenses bailable.] 
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
;°- [Trial by jury.] 
;!• [Courts opetv — Redress of injuries.} 
*•• [Rights of accused persons.] 
**• [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury] 
**• [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
;° [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
;*• [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
;'• [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
;*• [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
;9 [Treason defined — Proof.] 
^ [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
•; [Slavery forbidden.] 
*^  (Private property for public use.] 
y [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
'] [Uniform operation of laws.1 
"
r
 [Rights retained by people.] 
Section 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of tha t 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All polit ical power inherent in the people . ] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec . 4 . [Rel ig ious l iberty — N o property qual i f icat ion 
to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rus t or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State , 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 1896 
[Rel igious liberty.] [Proposed.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State , 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. {19991 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd SJS.) 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
679 
TabC 
STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 63-30-11 
Dvernmental entities is waived for any injury caused from 
mgerous or defective condition of any public building, 
;ture, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 1991 
0-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee — Ex-
ceptions. 
imunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
ljury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of 
;mployee committed within the scope of employment 
pt if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not 
the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of pro-
cess, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract 
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or 
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke 
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without 
probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not 
it is negligent or intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or con-
trolled lands, any condition existing in connection with an 
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity 
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State 
Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management 
or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or 
natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or 
storm systems; 
115) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being 
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 
41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
^y highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
divert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located 
011
 them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
^y public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
P^lic improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
•b) fighting fire; 
(L') regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
.j9> the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
? e ° r perform any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 
^
 ()r
 Title 73, Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition 
a
'l other immunities granted by law. 1996 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private 
property wi thout compensat ion. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Consti-
tution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmen-
tal entity when the governmental entity has taken or dam-
aged private property for public uses without just compensa-
tion. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according 
to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
1991 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests . 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 
and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsec-
tion (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition 
for review under Section 63-2-404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a 
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought 
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a 
subsequent action. 1992 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — 
Service — Legal disability. 
( D A claim arises when the statute of limitations tha t 
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins 
to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a govern-
mental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as govern-
mental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief s tatement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as 
they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is 
against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against 
a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business adminis-
trator of the board, when the claim is against a 
school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, 
when the claim is against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the 
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court 
to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
TabD 
63-30-3 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other 
than property damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, 
school district, public transit district, redevelopment 
agency, special improvement or taxing district, or other 
governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any 
right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any 
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, 
institution, hospital, college, university, or other instru-
mentality of the state. 1999 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental ent i t ies from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other gov-
ernmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following 
state medical programs and services performed at a 
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to 
the core of governmental activity in this state and are 
considered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or 
physician because of the high risk nature of the 
patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah 
only at a state-owned university hospital or provided 
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned 
university acting in the scope of their employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropri-
ate medical care or treatment at another medical 
facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a 
state-owned university hospital or by physicians em-
ployed at a state-owned university acting in the scope 
of their employment that a court finds is unique or 
essential to the core of governmental activity in this 
state. 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the 
limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may 
submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and 
the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to 
be governmental functions, and governmental entities and 
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center 
are immune from suit for any injury which results from their 
joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title 
62A, Chapter 4a. 1991 
63-30-4. Act provis ions not construed as admission or 
denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immu-
nity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of em-
ployee — Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifi-
cally provided, may be construed as an admission or 
denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental 
entities or their employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, 
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity 
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by 
any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any 
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing gfyU 
liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as advehaJ* 
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental e a S 
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federalS? 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an actta 
under this chapter against a governmental entity or w 
employee for an injury caused by an act or omission" tott 
occurs during the performance of the employee's dutift 
within the scope of employment, or under color of autW 
ity is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other QV3 
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter 
against the employee or the estate of the employee who* 
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through 
fraud or malice; or 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the condi-
tions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36(3Xc). 'M; * 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against I 
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which the governniimfaj 
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held persQMBt 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the perfonnanci 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment,** 
under color of authority, unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. iim 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual oblifl* 
t ions. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entit&Ql 
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising OttUf 
contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to jfet 
requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13,6Wk 
14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. ^ 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of ftjfm 
Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from • 
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 
26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver w* 
contractual amount of water is due to drought, other naturtl 
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in tfct 
amount of available water. * i m 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions invofrttl 
property. ^ 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is wi i j l 
for the recovery of any property real or personal or for tw* 
possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to 
mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any aJ™^* 
claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any ttwfr 
gage or other lien said entity may have or claim on P» 
property involved. • ^ 
63-30-7. Repealed. m 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused vj v* 
fective, unsafe, or dangerous conditiottjff 
h ighways , bridges, or other structures. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exo 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from t 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury causedI 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway^ 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, P*\ ^ 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from d a W ^ J 
or defect ive public building, structuf* 
other public improvement — Except ioD-^^ 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exCC*55f 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity fromfiKil 
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Hi UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 
(4) Application of rules to motions, orders, and other papers. 
*£ rules applicable to captions, signings, and other matters 
^form of pleadings apply to all motions, orders, and other 
^pers provided for by these rules. 
x) Demurrers, pleas, etc., abolished. Demurrers, pleas, and 
opt ions for insufficiency of a pleading shall not be used. 
gale 8. G e n e r a l r u l e s of p l ead ings . 
la) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
-jief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
jkird-party claim, shall contain ( D a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; 
jDd<2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall s tate in short 
jnd plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall 
jdmit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party 
jelies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to 
form a belief as to the t ruth of an averment, he shall so state 
md this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the 
mbstance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in 
jood faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an 
iverment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material 
md shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
* good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding 
pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of 
designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally 
ieny all the averments except such designated averments or 
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so 
intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general 
ienial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding plead-
ing, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfac-
tion, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory 
legligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure 
i consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, s ta tute of 
feuds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
^instituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a 
party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim 
* a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
quires, shall t reat the pleadings as if there had been a 
proper designation. 
d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to 
*hich a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to 
: ie amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the 
"tsponsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no 
*$ponsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
knied or avoided. 
e> Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
I' Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, 
tfd direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are 
Quired. 
2' A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim 
* defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or 
*knse or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more 
^tements are made in the alternative and one of them if 
^ l e independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not 
^ue insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
^ n a t i v e statements. A party may also state as many 
^Parate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency 
^ whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. 
x
*
 statements shall be made subject to the obligations set 
'^h in Rule 11. 
*' Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so 
n
*truod as to do substantial justice. 
Rule 9. P l e a d i n g spec ia l m a t t e r s . 
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a 
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be 
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an 
organized association of persons that is made a party. When a 
party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any 
party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative 
capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which 
shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly 
within the pleader's knowledge, and on such issue the party 
relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall 
establish the same on the trial. 
(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does 
not know the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact 
in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be 
designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; 
provided, that when the t rue name of such adverse party is 
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended 
accordingly. 
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown 
parties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties 
are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings 
may describe such unknown persons as ttall other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien 
upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to 
the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments 
of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be 
averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or 
occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver 
generally that all conditions precedent have been performed 
or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall 
be made specifically and with particularity, and when so made 
the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the 
trial establish the facts showing such performance or occur-
rence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official docu-
ment or act it is sufficient to aver that the document was 
issued or the act done in compliance with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a 
domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or 
of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or 
decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to 
render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and 
with particularity and when so made the party pleading the 
judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all contro-
verted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the suffi-
ciency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material 
and shall be considered like all other averments of material 
matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are 
claimed, they shall be specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limita-
tions it is not necessary to state the facts showing the defense 
but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is 
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or 
describing such statute specifically and definitely by section 
number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designat-
ing the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. 
If such allegation is controverted, the party pleading the 
statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the 
cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private stat-
ute of this state, or an ordinance of any political subdivision 
Rule 10 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 70$ 
thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is 
sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and 
the day of its passage or by its section number or other 
designation in any official publication of the s tatutes or 
ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice 
thereof, 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an 
action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts 
showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory 
matter out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to s tate 
generally that the same was published or spoken concerning 
the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party 
alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, 
that it was so published or spoken. 
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or 
slander, the defendant may allege both the t ruth of the mat ter 
charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to 
reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the-
justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating 
circumstances. 
Rule 10. Form of p leadings and other papers . 
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. 
All pleadings and other papers filed with the court shall 
contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title 
of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or 
other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the 
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall 
include the names of all the parties, but other pleadings and 
papers need only state the name of the first party on each side 
with an indication that there are other parties. A party whose 
name is not known shall be designated by any name and the 
words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, 
unknown parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons 
who claim any interest in the subject matter of the action." 
Every pleading and other paper filed with the court shall also 
state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of 
any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which 
information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first 
page. Every pleading shall state the name and address of the 
party for whom it is filed; this information shall appear in the 
lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. The 
plaintiff shall file together with the complaint a completed 
cover sheet substantially similar in form and content to the 
cover sheet approved by the Judicial Council. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim 
or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the con-
tents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to 
a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph 
may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. 
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence 
and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a 
separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates 
the clear presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading 
may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same 
pleading or in another pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit 
to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. 
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and 
other papers filed with the court, except printed documents or 
other exhibits, shall be typewritten, printed or photocopied in 
black type on good, white, ungiazed paper of letter size (8 1/2" 
x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches above any 
typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a 
right-hand margin of not less than one-half inch, and a bottom 
margin of not less than one-half inch. Ail typing or printing 
shall be clearly legible, shall be double-spaced, except for 
matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and shall n$|& 
be smaller than pica size. Typing or printing shall a p p e a r ^ ] 
one side of the page only. 
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed undei' 
all signature lines, and all signatures shall be made M: 
permanent black or blue ink. 
(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk.' 
of the court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filejj 
with the court. If they are not prepared in conformity with thij| 
rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but may require counsel 
to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconformi^|T 
papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements <#-
this rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause showilfe 
the court may relieve any party of any requirement of tih^^ 
rule. 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleaiS 
ing or paper filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the coiinf 
may, upon motion, with or without notice, authorize a codS 
thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original. 
Rule 11. S igning of p leadings , motions , and other, 
pers; representat ions to court; sanct ions . 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and ot] 
paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in'i 
attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represen 
by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper sh 
state the signer's address and telephone number, if i 
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or stab 
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.^ 
unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of<$ 
signature is corrected promptly after being called to* 
attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a plead 
written motion, or other paper to the court (whether 
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney!! 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of (J 
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after4 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, & 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless i 
crease in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions the 
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous arguBttji 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing lawJ 
the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have! 
dentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likeljgj 
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity^ 
further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted o n /KB^| 
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably bal«fc 
on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable oppor 
to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has 1 
violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated 1 
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law 1 
or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are respo« 
for the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule i 
be made separately from other motions or requests and ( 
describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision! 
It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not b e " 
with or presented to the court unless, within 2i days 
service of the motion (or such other period as the court i 
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, content] 
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately* 
rected. If warranted, the court may award to the 
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To: Carl Wanlass 
From: American Fork City Employees, Departments in General 
Date: July 1,1997 
RE: Grievance 
This memo Is forwarded with the intent to pursue resolution by grievance the following 
natters: 
\i. issue is the matter of Councilman George. Brown violating employees rights to 
reedom of speech in that he did threaten and intimidate an employee of American Fork 
Jfty for exercising his right as a citizen to voice an opinion in an open City Council 
leeting. That in doing so BROWN has created a hostile environment for all city 
mployees who would comment on city issues in open forum where opinions over such 
tatters are invited from the public and other interested parties. That ail city employees 
tust now be fearful of retaliation for expressing, their views and'beilefe in invited open 
rum if those views and beliefs are contrary to those held by Councilman George 
•own. 
issue Is the assault committed by Councilman George .Brown upon Lieutenant Terry 
x pursuant to an'investigation Lieutenant Fox had undertaken concerning the 
orderly conduct of George Brown on 6/25/97 in American Fork City Hall. George 
)wn had attempted to "browbeat" and incite confrontation with American Fork City 
iployees in a public place. .When he attempted to coerce an employee into giving a 
fcementto .police that was fevorable to Brown, Lieutenant Fox rightly corrected 
>wn, advising Brown not to tell the employee what to write in the statement 
ihcflman Brown then assaulted Lieutenant Fox in an attempt to intimidate him and 
trol the information release in the report of disorderly conduct and assaultive 
avior by Brown. At issue is the feet that all American Fork City Employees must 
be fearful of assaultive behavior from Councilman George Brown if their views and 
>ns are contrary to the views and beliefs of George Brown. 
sue is ihe repeated threats of termination from employment of American Fork City 
(oyees by Councilman George Brown. On numerous occasions George Brown has 
itened.terminatian of employment or has told employees to "resign" because the 
3yee has disagreed with Browns opinions, views; or politics. 
BT, Brown has repeatedly violated American Fork Policy and Procedure 
sming personnel problems. Brown has repeatedly degraded, embarrassed, 
aned, and insulted American Fork City employees in open public forum, in public 
;, and in front of fellow city workers exposing American Fork City employees to 
humiliation and contempt 
At issue is the fact that Councilman George Brown has focused his repeated 
• demeaning behavior against female staff employees of American Fork City. That he 
takes pleasure in making ridiculing, demeaning; and coercing statements towards 
female staff in an effort to creat a hostile, abusive, and intimidating work environment 
for them. 
We therefore issue complaint and grieve the above listed issues and seek relief under-
.section IX of American Fork City Policy and Procedure. We Grieve the fact that • 
Councilman George Brown has violated Utah Criminal Code 76-9-102- Disorderly 
Conduct, 76-5-102.4- Assault against a peace officer, and Amencan ForicCity Policy 
and Procedures Section Vli (C)(2)- Indulging in Offensive Conduct 
Expected Resolution: We demand that American Fork City Councilman'George 
Brown be reprimanded by the body of City. Council That he be advised that his. ^  
conduct has-adverseiy affected the efficiency, harmony, and good order of Amencan 
Fork City employees, and that his actions could reasonably cause the public to lose 
confidence in American Fork City Government We demand that American Fork City' 
Councilman George Brown, when acting in his capacity as a representative of Amencan 
Fork City government be courteous and civil with the public and Amencan Fork-City 
Employees. That he not use abusive, indecent course, harsh, loud, or profane 
language in any public place, and shall not expose City employees to public humniation 
and contempt That he refrain from physically assaultive and intimidating behavior. 
This Complaint and Grievance in no way limits individual persons from seeking 
for damages, civil and criminal, against George Brown. 

